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Abstract
In a widely cited paper, Young (1995) showed that the East Asian miracles (Hong
Kong, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan) grew mostly through input accumulation during
the period 1966-1990. Using data for 83 countries taken from the Penn World Table,
version 6.1, and Barro and Lee (2000), we use a common methodology in order to
compare the growth performance of the East Asian miracles with the rest of the world.
We ﬁnd that, even though the TFP growth rates of the four East Asian miracles were
not remarkable in absolute values, they were very high in relative terms. We argue
that, since Young (1995) focused only on the four East Asian miracles, he did not
notice that 1966-1990 was a period of particularly low TFP growth and particularly
high factor accumulation in the world. Despite the fact that they had high rates of
physical capital accumulation, the distinguishing feature of these miracles was their
relative productivity growth performance.
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11 Introduction
In a widely cited paper, Young (1995) showed that the so-called East Asian miracles (Hong
Kong, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan) grew mostly through input accumulation during the
1966-1990 period. To some degree, this result is puzzling. Recent papers by Klenow and
Rodriguez-Clare (1997), Prescott (1998) and Hall and Jones (1999), among others, have
established what now seems to be a consensus that total factor productivity (TFP) is more
relevant than factors of production in explaining output per worker dispersion. To the extent
that the level of output per worker of a given country can be thought of as the result of its
cumulative growth experience, it is diﬃcult to reconcile this evidence with Young’s results.
This paper intends to provide such a reconciliation. Using data for 83 countries taken
from the Penn World Table, version 6.1, and Barro and Lee (2000), we use a common
methodology in order to compare the growth performance of the East Asian miracles with
the rest of the world. Even though our data is much less detailed than the one Young
assembled for the four Asian Tigers, we are able to assess in which dimensions the growth
experience of the East Asian miracles is exceptional in comparison to the rest of the world.
Our goal is not to obtain new estimates of total factor productivity growth for the East Asian
miracles. In fact, with the exception of Singapore, our calculations of TFP growth are very
similar to Young’s. The contribution of this paper is to compare the growth performance
of the East Asian Tigers to the rest of the world, in particular with respect to productivity
growth.
We ﬁnd that, although the TFP growth rates of the four East Asian miracles were not
remarkable in absolute values, they were extraordinary in relative terms. We argue that,
since Young (1995) focused only on the four East Asian miracles, he did not notice that
1966-1990 was a period of particularly low TFP growth and very high factor accumulation
in the world. In fact, whereas the average annual rate of TFP growth in the world was
-0.17%, the Asian Tigers had an average TFP growth rate of 2.09%. Despite the fact that
they had high rates of physical capital accumulation, the distinguishing feature of these
miracles was their relative productivity growth performance. This result is robust if we
compare the growth rate of TFP of the East Asian miracles with the world average TFP
growth excluding the economic disasters and if we consider the wider time interval between
1960 to 2000.1 Moreover, even though we focus on the four East Asian Tigers for the sake
of comparibility with Young (1995), our results generalize to other fast growers.
1The growth rate of TFP for the world average excluding disasters was 0.18% during the period 1966-
1990. For the period 1960-2000 the average annual rate of TFP growth in the world was 0.22% (0.55%
excluding disasters), whereas the Asian Tigers had an average TFP growth rate of 2.22%.
2The comparison with the rest of the world is crucial for two reasons. First, just by
deﬁnition, a miracle is necessarily a relative concept. A few studies, including Klenow
and Rodriguez-Clare (1997) and Hsieh (2002), have argued that TFP growth in East Asia
was higher than found by Young, using diﬀerent methods. The ﬁrst study argues that
growth in physical capital inducedby risingproductivity should be attributed toproductivity.
Once this adjustment is made, Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997) conclude that, in three
of the four East Asian miracles, growth in output per worker came primarily from gains
in total factor productivity. Hsieh (2002) argues that the low estimates of TFP growth
obtained by Young result from ﬂaws in National Account Data. Using estimates of total
factor productivity growth based on factor prices (which in principle are more accurate), he
found considerably higher TFP growth rates in East Asia than the ones obtained by Young.
However, even though these two studies show that TFP growth rates in East Asia were
probably higher than found by Young, they imply that TFP growth rates in the rest of the
world were higher as well. For this reason, they cannot establish if TFP growth was the
distinctive characteristic of the East Asian miracles.2
Second, several models point toward a focus on relative rather than absolute growth
performance. For example, the neoclassical growth model assumes that all countries have
access to world knowledge. Moreover, models of technology transfer across countries typically
have the implication that, in the long run, all economies grow at the same rate, determined
by the growth rate of the technological frontier (e.g., Parente and Prescott (1994)). These
models thus imply that the growth performance of any given country should not be assessed
in isolation, but should instead be compared with the rest of the world.
A few other studies have made comparisons of the economic performance of the East
Asian Miracles with the rest of the world. For example, Young (1994) argued that the East
Asian miracles did not have extraordinarily high total factor productivity growth rates in
comparison with other countries, using a sample of 114 countries during the period 1970-
1985. The comparative studies by Collins and Bosworth (1996) and Bosworth and Collins
(2003) argue that the East Asian economies are not unusual in regard to their TFP growth.
However, as we show in this paper, their results are not robust to the choice of diﬀerent time
periods or country groupings.
This paper is organized in four sections in addition to this introduction. In Section 2 we
present the results of growth accounting exercises. Section 3 presents ranking comparisons
2As argued in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004), the growth decompositions for the East Asian miracles are
consistent with very diﬀerent views of the relative importance of productivity growth, depending on the way
their observed TFP growth rates are adjusted to take into account how physical and human capital respond
endogenously to exogenous productivity improvements.
3of sources of growth for the East Asian miracles relative to the rest of the world. Section 4
compares our results to other studies in the literature. Section 5 concludes.
2 Methodology, Data and Growth Accounting Results





where yit is the output per worker of country i at time t, k stands for physical capital per
worker, H is human capital (education) per worker, and A is total factor productivity (TFP).
We use a Mincerian (e.g., Mincer (1974)) formulation of schooling returns to skills to model
human capital, H. In particular, it is assumed that the skill level of a worker with h years of
schooling is H = expφ(h) greater than that of a worker with no education. The speciﬁcation
of the function φ(h) takes into account international evidence (e.g., Psacharopoulos (1994))
of a positive and diminishing relationship between average schooling and return to education.
Hence, instead of the more usual linear return to education we follow Bils and Klenow (2000)
and set the φ function as φ(h) = θ
1−ψh1−ψ . According to their calibration, we have ψ = 0.58
and θ = 0.32.
In addition to these parameters we need to set the values of α and δ, the depreciation
rate used to construct the capital series. For α, we use 0.40: estimates in Gollin (2002) of
the capital share of output for a variety of countries ﬂuctuate around this value, a number
also close to that of the American economy according to the National Income and Product
Accounts (NIPA). We use the same depreciation rate for all economies, which was calculated
from US capital and investment data. From this calculation, we obtained δ = 3.5% per year
(average of the 1950-2000 period).
We used data for 83 countries during the period 1966-1990.3 Data on output per worker
and investment rates were obtained from the Penn-World Tables (PWT), version 6.1. We
used data on the average educational attainment of the population aged 15 years and over,
interpolated (in levels) to ﬁt an annual frequency, taken from Barro and Lee (2000).
The physical capital series is constructed with real investment data from the PWT using
the Perpetual Inventory Method. In this case we need an estimate of the initial capital
stock. We approximate it by K0 = I0/[(1 + g)(1 + n) − (1 − δ)], where K0 is the initial
3See the Appendix for a list of the countries included in the sample. We choose the period 1966-1990
because this is the period used in Young (1995). We also present results for total factor productivity growth
during other periods in Section 4.
4capital stock, I0 is the initial investment expenditure, g is the rate of technological progress
and n is the growth rate of the population.4 In this calculation it is assumed that all
economies were in a balanced growth path at time zero, so that I−j = (1 + n)
−j (1 + g)
−j I0.
To minimize the impact of economic ﬂuctuations we used the average investment of the ﬁrst
ﬁve years as a measure of I0. When data was available we started this procedure taking
1950 as the initial year in order to reduce the eﬀect of K0 in the capital stock series. We
obtained the rate of technological progress by adjusting an exponential trend to the U.S.
output per worker series, correcting for the increase in the average schooling of the labor
force and obtained g =1.53%. The population growth rate, n, is the average annual growth
rate of population in each economy between 1960 and 2000, calculated from population data
in the PWT.
In order to compute the value of Ait, we use the observed values of yit and the constructed








We now investigate the contribution of the various components of the production function
to the growth experience, from 1966 to 1990, of 83 economies, with special emphasis on the
East Asian miracles. We use equation (1), so that the variation of the log of output per
worker in the period is decomposed into the contribution of total factor productivity, capital














In addition to Young’s group of East Asian miracles (Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore and
Taiwan), we divided the economies in 5 groups, according to their growth rates of output
per worker: in the economic “Miracles” group (9 economies) the growth rate of output per
worker ranged from 4.09% to 8.37% per year, in the “Fast Growth” group (15 economies),
it ranged from 2.52% to 4.09%; in “Medium Growth” (31 economies), from 0.94% to 2.52%;
in “Slow Growth” (19 economies), from -0.63% to 0.94% and in the economic “Disasters”
group (9 economies), the average growth rate ranged from -2.65% to -0.63% per year.5
Table 1 presents the growth decomposition exercises for each group between 1966 and
4This follows Hall and Jones (1999), among others.
5We emphasize in the paper a group division based on growth rates, not geographical factors. In this
sense, the East Asian Tigers are part of the “Miracles” group and not a group by themselves. Of course,
given the focus of this note, we isolated these four countries as a “special group,” and that is why when we
add up the countries in the groups we obtain 87 countries and not 83.
51990. Throughout the period, output per worker grew at 1.68% per year on average, whereas
average total factor productivity decreased at an annual rate of 0.17%. The ﬁrst line of the
table shows the important role played by factors to explain growth rates. On average, 110%
of the observed growth of output per worker can be accounted by human and physical capital
accumulation, since TFP accounted for a negative contribution of 10%. Physical capital per
worker alone accounts for 68% of output per worker growth. If we exclude the Disasters, the
contribution of TFP is positive, but still very small (8%).
Table 1: Growth Decomposition (1966-1990)
country groups y k H TFP
Full Sample 1.68% 1.15% 0.70% -0.17%
(68%) (42%) (-10%)
Full Sample (Excluding Disasters) 2.24% 1.30% 0.72% 0.18%
(60%) (32%) (8%)
East Asian Miracles 5.68% 2.78% 0.80% 2.09%
(49%) (14%) (37%)
Miracles 4.57% 2.22% 0.80% 1.55%
(49%) (17%) (34%)
Fast Growth 2.60% 1.50% 0.68% 0.43%
(58%) (26%) (16%)
Medium Growth 1.65% 1.03% 0.68% -0.06%
(63%) (41%) (-4%)
Slow Growth 0.69% 0.85% 0.74% -0.90%
(123%) (108%) (-130%)
Disasters -1.09% 0.19% 0.59% -1.86%
(-17%) (-54%) (171%)
Note: The numbers in parenthesis are the relative contributions of each
factor to output per worker growth.
Notice, however, that the sample average hides a lot of information with respect to the
behavior of diﬀerent economies. In the East Asian Miracles group, TFP increased at an
annual rate of 2.09%, accounting for 37% of output per worker growth. For the “Miracles”
economies, the importance of TFP is similar (34%). This number falls monotonically with
the average growth rate in each group: it is 16% in the “Fast Growth” group, -4% for the
“Medium Growers” and -130% for the “Slow Growers.” For the “Disasters,” the fall in
productivity accounts for 171% of the decline in output per worker.
6In other words, the East Asian miracles were productivity miracles. In addition, poor
performers in general, and disasters in particular, had a very bad record of productivity
growth. The correlation between the growth rates of output per worker and TFP between
1966 and 1990 was 0.85. On the other hand, the correlation between the growth rates of
output per worker and capital per worker was also high, but smaller (0.73), whereas the
correlation of the ﬁrst with human capital per worker was only 0.17.
With regard to the East Asian miracles, a few additional facts drawn from Table 1 should
be emphasized. First, they grew on average 4% higher than the sample average (if we exclude
Disasters, the diﬀerence is 3.44%). If we compare their relative performance in terms of the
sources of growth, Table 1 shows that they had a slightly above average growth rate of human
capital per worker (0.80% in comparison to a sample average of 0.70%), and a much higher
than average growth rate of physical capital per worker (2.78% in comparison to a sample
average of 1.15%). As mentioned above, they also had an exceptional relative performance
in terms of TFP growth (2.09% in comparison to a sample average of -0.17%).
As several studies have pointed out (e.g., Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997), Hall and
Jones (1999)), the standard growth accounting procedure does not take into account the fact
that, according to the neoclassical growth model, a portion of the increase in the capital-
labor ratio is induced by an increase in total factor productivity. In order to attribute this
portion to TFP, we can perform a growth decomposition exercise in which the capital-labor






































Table 2 presents the results. The table conﬁrms that the East Asian miracles experienced,
at least in relative terms, exceptional TFP growth. On the other hand, their human capital
performance was very close to the world average. The table shows, in addition, that when
capital deepening is measured by the capital-output ratio, the performance of the East Asian
miracles was not extraordinary: their average annual growth rate in the period was just 0.06%
above the sample average. In fact, the average growth of κ of these countries was smaller
than that of the Disasters economies (1.03% per year). In this formulation, TFP explains
almost two thirds of output per worker growth of the East Asian Miracles, in contrast to a
negative contribution for the world mean (full sample).
7Table 2: Alternative Growth Decomposition (1966-1990)
country groups y κ H TFP
Full Sample 1.68% 0.79% 1.16% -0.28%
(47%) (69%) (-16%)
Full Sample (Excluding Disasters) 2.24% 0.75% 1.20% 0.30%
(33%) (54%) (13%)
East Asian Miracles 5.68% 0.85% 1.34% 3.49%
(15%) (24%) (61%)
Miracles 4.57% 0.65% 1.33% 2.59%
(14%) (29%) (57%)
Fast Growth 2.60% 0.76% 1.13% 0.71%
(29%) (43%) (27%)
Medium Growth 1.65% 0.62% 1.13% -0.10%
(38%) (68%) (-6%)
Slow Growth 0.69% 0.96% 1.24% -1.50%
(138%) (179%) (-217%)
Disasters -1.09% 1.03% 0.98% -3.10%
(-95%) (-90%) (285%)
Note: The numbers in parenthesis are the relative contributions of each
factor to output per worker growth.
3 Ranking Comparisons
Another way to assess the relative importance of total factor productivity growth for the East
Asian miracles is to rank all countries in terms of the sources of growth. Table 3 presents
rankings for the growth rates of output per worker, capital per worker, capital-output ratio,
human capital per worker and total factor productivity.6
As one can see, between 1966 and 1990 Singapore was the fastest TFP grower, Hong Kong
the second and Taiwan the ﬁfth. Even though Korea’s TFP record was not exceptional, it
ranked among the top 15 nonetheless. With the exception of the latter, the group did
not experience remarkable human capital growth rates. Even though they had very strong
growth rates of capital per worker, they were not unusual with respect to their growth rates
of the capital-output ratio. In other words, although these countries had very high rates
of physical capital accumulation, once we take into account their productivity performance,
6From now on all results for total factor productivity refer to the standard decomposition procedure,
based on (2).
8they did not experience exceptionally high capital deepening.
Table 3: Ranking Comparisons, Growth Rates, 1966-1990
countries y TFP k κ H
Hong Kong 5 2 20 76 33
Korea 3 14 4 15 11
Singapore 4 1 7 42 68
Taiwan 2 5 3 20 21
In order to assess the quantitative importance of diﬀerences in TFP growth rates for
relative performance, our methodology allow us to decompose easily the variations in the
growth rates of output per worker between each group and the East Asian miracles into
diﬀerences in the growth rates of its sources, as shown in Table 4.
Table 4: Decomposition of Growth Diﬀerences Between East
Asian Miracles and Groups, 1966-1990
country groups y k H TFP
Full Sample 4.00% 1.63% 0.11% 2.26%
Full Sample (Excluding Disasters) 3.44% 1.43% 0.08% 1.92%
Miracles 1.10% 0.56% 0.01% 0.54%
Fast Growth 3.07% 1.28% 0.13% 1.67%
Medium Growth 4.03% 1.74% 0.13% 2.15%
Slow Growth 4.99% 1.93% 0.06% 2.99%
Disasters 6.76% 2.59% 0.22% 3.95%
For example, diﬀerences in TFP growth rates account for 58.4% of the diﬀerence in growth
rates of output per worker between the East Asian Miracles and the Disasters. Speciﬁcally,
out of the 6.76% diﬀerence in growth rates of output per worker between these two groups,
2.59% and 0.22% are due to diﬀerences in the growth rates of physical capital per worker
and human capital per worker, respectively, whereas TFP growth diﬀerences account for the
remaining 3.95%. By the same token, diﬀerences in TFP growth rates account for 56.5% of
the diﬀerences in the growth rates of output per worker between the East Asian Miracles
and the world mean (full sample).7
7We used geometric averages in the calculation of the mean growth rate of each group. As we can see
easily from expression (2), the mean growth rate of y is equal to the sum of the mean growth rate of each
of its sources (A,k and H). Hence, we ﬁnd the contribution of, say, A to diﬀerences in the growth of y, by
simply comparing its mean growth among the Asian Tigers (2.09%) to its mean growth among the Disasters
(-1.86%). This 3.95% gap explains 58.4% of the 6.76% diﬀerence in y growth between these two groups.
9In the case of the alternative decomposition, the relative importance of TFP growth is
overwhelming: diﬀerences in TFP growth rates account for 97.4% of the diﬀerence in growth
rates of output per worker between the East Asian Miracles and the Disasters. Speciﬁcally,
out of the 6.76% diﬀerence in growth rates of output per worker between these two groups,
-0.19% and 0.37% are due to diﬀerences in the growth rates of the capital-output ratio and
human capital per worker, respectively, whereas TFP growth diﬀerences account for 6.59%.
Using the same procedure, we ﬁnd that diﬀerences in TFP growth rates account for 94.2%
of the diﬀerences in the growth rates of output per worker between the East Asian Miracles
and the world mean.8
4 Comparison with other studies in the literature
In this section, we compare our results with other studies of the East Asian productivity
performance. Table 5 presents the results.
Table 5: TFP Ranking and Annual Growth Rate Comparisons
66-90 70-85 60-2000 66-90 Young, 95 70-85 Young, 94
countries rank T￿ FP rank T￿ FP rank T￿ FP T￿ FP rank T￿ FP
Hong Kong 2 2.50% 1 2.28% 1 3.35% 2.30% 6 2.50%
Korea 14 1.35% 33 0.11% 10 1.52% 1.70% 24 1.40%
Singapore 1 2.55% 11 1.13% 3 2.68% 0.20% 63 0.10%
Taiwan 5 1.98% 18 0.82% 7 1.97% 2.10% 21 1.50%
Note: T￿ FP is the average annual growth rate of TFP.
Several results deserve comment. First, when considering the 1966-1990 period we can
observe that, with the exception of Singapore, our numbers are very close to those in Young
(1995), which used the same time span.9 In fact, for Korea and Taiwan, TFP growth rates
in Young’s paper are greater than ours. What should be stressed is that, even though these
rates are not particularly high in absolute values, they are well above those experienced by
the rest of the world during the same period. Speciﬁcally, three out of the four East Asian
miracles were among the top ﬁve TFP performers from 1966 to 1990. The reason is that, as
8The full results are available from the authors upon request.
9Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997) ﬁnd a value for the growth rate of TFP in Singapore similar to ours.
As they argue, the discrepancy between our numbers and the one obtained by Young is due to two reasons.
First, the census data used by him show faster growth of the labor force than the Penn World Table. Second,
Young uses a larger value for the capital share parameter (0.49).
10shown in Table 1, average TFP growth was either negative (including Disasters) or positive
but very small (excluding Disasters) during this period.
Second, Young (1994) argued that the East Asian miracles did not have extraordinarily
high total factor productivity growth rates in comparison with other countries, using a
sample of 114 countries during the period 1970-1985. As shown in Table 5, when we use
the same period we obtain rankings for these countries similar to Young’s.10 Hence, for
this particular period, it turns out that the East Asian miracles did not have particularly
remarkable productivity performances. However, as shown in Table 5, if we consider a
longer period, such as 1960-2000, the pattern again resembles the one observed for 1966-
1990. Speciﬁcally, for the period 1960-2000, all the four East Asian miracles were among the
top 10 TFP performers.
In summary, since Young (1995) focused only on the four East Asian miracles, he did
not notice that this was a period of particularly low TFP growth in the world. Even though
the TFP growth rates of these countries were not remarkable in absolute values, they were
extraordinary in relative terms. On the other hand, although Young (1994) was correct
in pointing out that from 1970 to 1985 TFP growth of the Asian Tigers economies did
not rank high, this period is not representative of their productivity performance in the
last four decades. The reason may be that these countries did not postpone the necessary
macroeconomic adjustments in face of the oil shocks of the seventies, so that they experienced
initial recessions followed by strong recoveries. Hence, the period chosen by Young (1994)
may be capturing this short-run adjustment, whereas the longer periods reveal their true
long-run productivity gains.
Another comparative study by Collins and Bosworth (1996) argued that “The East
Asian economies are unusual primarily in regard to capital accumulation, not TFP growth”
(p.171).11 Since their conclusion contradicts our ﬁndings, a few comments should be made.
First, their group of East Asian countries does not match the group of four East Asian mir-
acles that we and Young (1995) use. In particular, their group includes Korea, Taiwan and
Singapore, but does not include Hong Kong. In addition, they include Indonesia, Malaysia,
Philippines and Thailand. For the countries that are included in their study and ours, and
using similar time periods, our results are similar, with the exception of Singapore. Specif-
ically, for the period 1960-1994, they found TFP growth rates of 1.5%, 1.5% and 2.0% for
Korea, Singapore and Taiwan, respectively. As Table 5 shows, for the period 1960-2000,
10In fact, and again with the exception of Singapore, he obtains higher growth rates, as the growth
decompositions from which his TFP results were obtained did not include human capital. This and his
larger sample account for the diﬀerences between his ranking and ours.
11See Bosworth and Collins (2003) for an update of this study which conﬁrms its main conclusions regarding
the relative productivity performance of the East Asian countries.
11we found TFP growth rates of 1.52%, 2.68% and 1.97% for Korea, Singapore and Taiwan,
respectively.
Second, since they exclude Hong Kong, for which TFP growth was particularly high,
and include countries with low or negative TFP growth rates, such as the Philippines, their
group displays lower growth rates of output per worker and TFP than our group of four East
Asian Tigers. For their group of East Asian countries, we found growth rates of output per
worker and TFP of 4.38% and 1.24%, respectively, while for the four East Asian Tigers these
growth rates were 5.83% and 2.52%, respectively. In addition, their regional average growth
rates are calculated by weighting each country by its average real GDP over 1960-94. Since a
large country such as Indonesia had an average TFP growth rate lower than all four Tigers,
their procedure tends to reduce average TFP growth for the broader East Asian group.
This discussion should make it evident that comparisons between regional groups are
somewhat arbitrary, with its results depending on which speciﬁc countries are included in
each group. In this paper, we focus on the four East Asian Miracles for the sake of compa-
rability with Young (1995). Moreover, we classify groups in terms of their growth rates of
output per worker, which we believe is a more informative division than regional character-
istics for the reasons stated above.
5 Conclusions
Alwyn Young’s papers on East Asian growth (Young, 1994, 1995) have spurred a controversy
regarding the importance of TFP for the extraordinary growth performance of the East Asian
Miracles (Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan) that is yet to be settled.12 This paper
presented a contribution to this debate by analyzing their TFP growth performance from a
comparative perspective. We found that, despite the fact that these countries experienced
very high rates of physical capital accumulation, the distinguishing feature of their recent
development experience was their extraordinary productivity growth performance. The im-
portant point is that, even though the TFP growth rates of the East Asian miracles were
not particularly high in absolute values, they were unusually high in comparison to the TFP
growth rates experienced by the rest of the world during the same period (1966-1990).
Even though we focused on the four East Asian Tigers for the sake of comparability with
Young (1994, 1995), our results generalize to other fast growers. Speciﬁcally, a common fea-
ture of “miracles” and fast-growing countries is above average TFP growth, at the same time
that productivity decreased in most of the “disasters” and slow-growing economies. When
12See Islam (2001) for a recent survey of this literature.
12put in world perspective, growth miracles (disasters) are TFP growth miracles (disasters).
This helps reconcile the world growth experience in the last decades with the recent evidence
that TFP accounts for the bulk of output per worker dispersion among countries, as found
by Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997) and Prescott (1998), among many.
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6 Appendix
A List of Countries by Growth Groups
East Asian Miracles: Taiwan, Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore.
Miracles: Botswana, Taiwan, Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong, Thailand, Indonesia,
Japan, Cyprus.
Fast Growth: Barbados, Ireland, Portugal, Pakistan, Italy, Malaysia, Finland, Austria,
India, Spain, Greece, Syria, Turkey, Brazil, Paraguay.
Medium Growth: Ecuador, Israel, Tunisia, France, Lesotho, Belgium, Mauritius,
Colombia, Norway, Zimbabwe, Dominican Republic, United Kingdom, Germany, Fiji, Nether-
lands, Nepal, USA, Guatemala, Panama, Iceland, Sweden, Jordan, Australia, Malawi, South
Africa, Philippines, Canada, Denmark, Kenya, Bangladesh, Uruguay.
Slow Growth: Switzerland, Trinidad & Tobago, Mexico, Cameroon, Honduras, Chile,
Costa Rica, Uganda, Tanzania, Papua New Guinea, Togo, Iran, Ghana, Argentina, Jamaica,
New Zealand, Bolivia, El Salvador, Senegal.
Disasters: Zambia, Central African Republic, Peru, Guyana, Mozambique, Niger, Venezuela,
Nicaragua, Congo.
14B Building the Groups
The procedure to divide the 83 countries in 5 groups can be described as follows. First,
we divided by 7 the interval between the lowest and the highest average annual growth
rate of output per worker between 1966 and 1990, obtaining a value of 1.57%. The aver-
age growth rate of output per worker throughout this period was 1.73% (this is the exact
average growth rate, which is slightly diﬀerent from the average logarithmic growth rate of
1.68% used in the growth decompositions). Then we obtained the limits of the central inter-
val: 2.52%=1.73%+(1.57%/2) and 0.94%=1.73%-(1.57%/2). The resulting interval, [0.94%,
2.52%], gives the “Medium Growth” group. We obtained the successive intervals by adding
and subtracting 1.57%, for example, -0.63%=0.94%-1.57% and 4.09%=2.52%+1.57%. By
adding 1.57% to 4.09%, we obtain 5.66%. The interval [5.66%,∞) would correspond to a
category of “Super Miracles,” including only four countries (Botswana, Taiwan, Korea and
Singapore). We included these four countries in the group of “Miracles.” Analogously, if
we subtract 1.57% from -0.63%, we obtain -2.21%. The interval (-∞,−2.21%] would cor-
respond to “Super Disasters,” including two countries, Nicaragua and Congo, which were
incorporated to the “Disasters.” This procedure leads to the group division presented in the
text.
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